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An Analytical Framework for Discussing Farm Business Interruption Insurance for 
Classical Swine Fever 
 
Epidemics of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) can have very large, devastating financial 
consequences. Recent CSF-epidemics in Europe include epidemics in Belgium (1990 and  5 
1993/94), Germany (1993/94), Spain and the Netherlands (1997/98), and (again) Germany 
(1999) (Office International des Epizooties, and OIE-internet site). The financial 
consequences of the CSF-epidemic in the Netherlands were the highest so far totaling US 
$2.3 billion (Meuwissen et al.). Part of these losses were borne by governments. However, 
business interruption losses (US $247 million) had to be completely borne by farmers. As a  10 
result, many affected farms were close to bankruptcy. Some farmers would even have gone 
bankrupt if banks and other financiers had not been willing to work with them.  
  We study the feasibility of business interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever to 
protect farmers against such financial disasters in the future. Meuwissen, Huirne and 
Hardaker found that farmers perceive the risk of epidemics as a very important source of risk  15 
and that farmers are interested in buying insurance protection against losses caused by 
epidemics.  
  In discussing insurance for Classical Swine Fever, an important issue is the little 
information available about the size of risk. This study provides such insight by a detailed 
Monte-Carlo simulation model. The model is partly based on insights provided by existing  20 
(epidemiological and financial) models (Horst et al., 1999a, Jalvingh et al., Meuwissen et al., 
and Nielen et al.).  
  Published literature on insuring losses from livestock epidemics is scarce. Available work 
by Davies, and Howe and Whittaker is only qualitative and refers to direct costs instead of 
business interruption losses.   25 3 
  This paper begins with a short background on livestock epidemics (control measures, loss 
factors, compensation by government). Then the structure and results of the Monte-Carlo 
simulation model are described, followed by a range of issues that need to be considered 
when introducing a business interruption insurance for epidemics. The last sections include 




Livestock epidemics in the European Union of so-called ‘List-A diseases’ (Office 
International des Epizooties), such as Classical Swine Fever, are controlled by stamping-out  10 
infected herds, pre-emptive slaughter of contact herds, and by immediately establishing 
surveillance zones around such herds. In these zones, animal movements are restricted and to 
a large extent prohibited. Depending on the severity of the epidemic, national governments 
can take additional control measures, such as the pre-emptive slaughter of all herds within a 
certain radius (for example 1 km) of infected herds. If the established surveillance zones lead  15 
to severe animal welfare problems on the farms that are located in these zones, so-called 
welfare slaughter is generally applied to reduce such problems (Vanthemsche, and Pluimers et 
al.).  
  Losses related to the control measures can be divided into direct costs and consequential 
losses (Meuwissen et al.). Direct costs refer to the value of destroyed animals (all animals in  20 
stamping-out, pre-emptive slaughter, and welfare slaughter programs are destroyed and 
rendered), and the costs of organizational aspects such as the monitoring of farms in 
surveillance zones.  
  For farmers, consequential losses include, among others, losses from business interruption, 
and, after a time, costs of repopulating the farm. Business interruption occurs because farm  25 4 
buildings become empty due to stamping-out, pre-emptive slaughter, or welfare slaughter, and 
stay empty until surveillance zones are lifted. With stamping-out and pre-emptive slaughter, 
buildings are completely emptied (i.e. depopulated). With welfare slaughter, buildings may 
only become partly empty (depending on the type (age/weight) of pigs slaughtered and on the 
type of farm). Losses related to repopulating the farm include losses due to extra weeks with  5 
empty buildings (for example because new sows are not readily available) and extra costs of 
animal health problems
1.  
  The other source of consequential losses for farmers includes losses related to established 
surveillance zones: farms in surveillance zones face (long) periods in which pigs (such as 
fattening pigs and culled sows) and manure can not be transported from the farm. These  10 
periods are characterized by animal welfare problems, extra feeding costs, and emergency 
measures for housing of pigs and storage of manure.  
  For related industries, consequential losses originate from such aspects as a decline in the 
number of animals slaughtered, the number of trade transactions, and quantity of feed sold. 
  Direct costs are largely borne by governments (national and EU). Consequential losses  15 
need to be borne by farmers and related industries (Horst et al., 1999b). For business 
interruption on farms, losses include US $1.18 per day for a farrowing sow and US $0.20 per 
day for a finishing place. For a typical one-person Dutch farm this is about US $300 per day 
or 0.3 per cent of a farmer’s typical annual income (Meuwissen et al.).  
  20 
The size of risk 
 
Ideally, insight into the size of risk is obtained from historical information. For epidemics, 
however, historical data, if at all available, has limited value due to a low frequency of 
epidemics, continuously changing legislation with respect to prevention and control strategies  25 5 
applied, and a large variability in possible outcomes. Monte-Carlo simulation is an 
appropriate alternative for obtaining insight into losses, and what-if analyses can be used to 
study the impact of changes in the input parameters (Law and Kelton).  
 
Monte-Carlo simulation of Classical Swine Fever  5 
 
A Monte-Carlo simulation model is developed (in @Risk; Palisade) that gives insight into 
expected losses from CSF-epidemics. To demonstrate the features of the model, we applied it 
to the southern part of the Netherlands, which is an area of very dense swine population 
(Nagel) and the center of the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic. The area contains more than 75 per cent  10 
of the total number of pigs (i.e. 14 million) in the Netherlands. Figure 1 shows the structure of 
the simulation model. 
Figure 1 
The model consists of three major parts (so-called ‘sub-models’). The first part provides 
the simulation model with information on the number of CSF-epidemics per year. The second  15 
and third part simulate the epidemiological and financial extent of each of these epidemics. 
Then, losses from year t are summed and multiple iterations
2 provide insight into the 
distribution of annual losses (Law and Kelton). The three sub-models are explained below. 
 
Frequency of epidemics. Since the Netherlands are in principle free of CSF, the occurrence  20 
of an epidemic is caused by the introduction of CSF-virus from other countries. Parameters in 
the sub-model that determine the number of CSF-epidemics in the Netherlands refer to the 
frequency of CSF-epidemics in other European countries, the duration of so-called ‘high risk 
periods’
3, and the risks related to the import and export of livestock, and the import of animal 6 
products. For a more detailed description of this sub-model, reference is made to Horst et al. 
(1999a).  
 
Epidemiological extent of epidemics. The sub-model on the epidemiological extent of 
epidemics refers to a very detailed, spatial, dynamic and stochastic simulation model. Given  5 
the occurrence of a CSF-epidemic, the model simulates the spread of CSF-virus between 
farms through local spread and contacts (from transport, animals, and persons), and given a 
specific control strategy. Parameters in the model are, among others, based on the 1997/98 
CSF-epidemic in the Netherlands. Output from this sub-model is very extensive and includes 
among others the number of farms infected and the number of farms under surveillance for  10 
each day of an epidemic. Details of the model are provided by Jalvingh et al. and Nielen et al. 
 
Financial impact of epidemics. Epidemiological information is translated into financial 
data by the third sub-model. This financial model calculates also on a very detailed 
level direct costs and consequential losses for all participants of the livestock production  15 
chain. Details of this sub-model are explained by Meuwissen et al. 
 
Results of Monte-Carlo simulation 
 
  Results of sub-models: most likely scenarios. In relation to the frequency of CSF-epidemics  20 
in the southern part of the Netherlands (first sub-model), the most likely scenario concerns a 
frequency of on average 1 epidemic per 5 years (Horst et al., 1999a). Figure 2 shows the 
probability density function of the number of epidemics per year for this scenario. 
Figure 2 7 
  As Figure 2 illustrates, the probability of zero epidemics per year is highest, i.e. 0.82. The 
probability of 1, or more than 1, epidemic per year is 0.17 and 0.01 respectively. The mean 
number of epidemics per year resulting from this distribution is 0.20 with a standard deviation 
of 0.44. 
  With regard to the epidemiological extent of epidemics, the most likely scenario concerns a  5 
scenario in which epidemics are controlled by the minimum EU control strategy. Given this 
strategy (and combining output from the sub-models on the epidemiological and financial 
extent of epidemics), Figure 3 shows the expected total losses (million US $) from a CSF-
epidemic in the southern part of the Netherlands (the left-hand part of the figure subdivides 
expected total losses into different categories, the right-hand part subdivides expected  10 
consequential losses for farmers into different causes of loss). 
Figure 3 
  As Figure 3 shows, expected total losses mainly consist of direct costs; these include US 
$872 million. The expected values of the consequential losses of related industries and 
farmers are US $268 million and US $170 million respectively. Of the consequential losses  15 
for farmers, US $76 million is due to repopulation and surveillance zones, and US $51 million 
and US $43 million due to business interruption (from depopulation and welfare slaughter 
respectively). Figure 4 shows the range around the expected values for both types of business 
interruption losses. 
Figure 4  20 
  As Figure 4 illustrates, the range of business interruption losses from depopulation is wider 
than that of business interruption losses from welfare slaughter, i.e. for depopulation, losses 
range from US $17 million to US $158 million, while these numbers are US $28 million and 
US $115 million respectively for welfare slaughter.  
  25 8 
  Results of sub-models: alternative scenarios. In relation to the frequency of epidemics we 
defined two alternative scenarios, i.e. one with an increase in the number of epidemics (to on 
average 2 per 5 years) and one with a decrease in the number of epidemics (to on average 1 
per 10 years). In the pessimistic scenario of on average 2 epidemics per 5 years, the mean 
number of epidemics per year is 0.40, with a spread from 0 to 4. In the optimistic scenario of  5 
1 epidemic per 10 years, these numbers are 0.10, 0, and 2 respectively. 
  With regard to the epidemiological extent of epidemics, also two alternative strategies 
were defined (Nielen et al.): one in which the minimum EU control strategy is extended with 
a pre-emptive slaughter program of all herds within a 2-km radius of infected herds, and one 
in which surveillance zones have a radius of 20 km instead of 10 km. With the more severe  10 
pre-emptive slaughter program (and focusing on business interruption losses), losses decrease 
significantly, i.e. expected business interruption losses decrease from $51 million for 
depopulation and US $43 million for welfare slaughter (see Figure 3) to US $28 million and 
US $10 million respectively. In the scenario with larger surveillance zones, expected business 
interruption losses from depopulation decrease, i.e. to US $47 million, but those of welfare  15 
slaughter increase (to US $77 million). 
  
  Results of the overall simulation model: most likely scenario. The first part of Table 1 
shows the results of the overall model for the most likely scenario of on average 1 epidemic 
per 5 years and with the minimum EU control strategy.   20 
Table 1 
  Table 1 shows that in the most likely scenario, expected annual total losses from CSF in 
the southern part of the Netherlands are US $246 million, with a range from zero to US $4.5 
billion. The expected annual losses of business interruption total US $18 million, with a range 
from zero to US $396 million (US $181 million + US $215 million).  25 9 
 
Results of the overall simulation model: alternative scenarios. In the pessimistic scenario 
(with on average 2 epidemics per 5 years and the control strategy with larger surveillance 
zones), expected annual total losses are three times higher than in the most likely scenario, i.e. 
US $761 million (Table 1). Expected annual losses from business interruption are US $48  5 
million (US $18 million + US $30 million), with a 0.95 fractile of US $207 million and a 
maximum of US $482 million. 
  In the optimistic scenario (with on average 1 epidemic per 10 years and the more severe 
pre-emptive slaughter program), expected annual total losses are US $75 million. Expected 
annual business interruption losses are now US $3 million and US $1 million for depopulation  10 
and welfare slaughter respectively. 
 
Careful considerations when introducing a farm business interruption insurance for 
livestock epidemics 
  15 
 Premium  rates. For the three scenarios presented in Table 1, premium rates for farm 
business interruption insurance (covering business interruption from depopulation as well as 
from welfare slaughter) have been calculated. Rates are based on expected claim cost (with 
zero deductible) for two situations, i.e. a situation in which expected losses are based on the 
whole loss distribution (as shown in Table 1), and a situation that considers the same loss  20 
distribution but without the catastrophic part of it, which is defined as the ‘last 5 per cent’ (or, 
the upper tail) of the loss distribution. Table 2 shows the expected premium rates for both 
situations. 
Table 2 10 
  In the most likely scenario and taking into account the whole loss distribution, premium 
rates per sow and per finishing place are US $8.44 and US $1.77 per year respectively. If 
farmers’ premiums do not need to cover the catastrophic part of the distribution, rates reduce 
significantly: to US $5.23 and US $1.09 respectively. Premium rates in the pessimistic and 
optimistic scenarios are significantly higher and lower respectively compared to these  5 
numbers.  
  The rates in the most likely scenario (and including the catastrophic part of the loss 
distribution), are about 2 per cent of the mean gross margin of sows and fattening pigs 
(Agricultural Information and Knowledge Center and Research Station for Animal 
Husbandry), and would be about 8 per cent of the mean insured value. If premiums in this  10 
same scenario were to be based on the data without the catastrophic part, these numbers are 
about 1 and 5 per cent respectively. Compared to other insurance schemes, such rates are 
relatively high.  
 
  The systemic character of the risk. Since epidemics generally involve many farms at the  15 
same time, losses can be catastrophic (as indicated by the maximum losses in Table 1). 
However, whether the maximum loss in the pessimistic scenario (US $199 million + US $283 
million = US $482 million; Table 1) is ‘catastrophic’ for an individual insurer, depends on 
several factors, such as the number and geographic spread of insured farmers, the extent to 
which the insurer’s portfolio is diversified, and the way reinsurance is arranged (Vaughan and  20 
Vaughan, and Miranda and Glauber). Considering the extent to which insurers already can 
deal with other systemic risks, such as hurricanes and earthquakes (Harrington and Niehaus), 
the systemic nature of the CSF-risk seems to be manageable for most insurers. 
 11 
  Influence of farmers on the size of risk. A farmer can influence the expected probability of 
his/her herd becoming infected. Factors that influence this probability include the sanitary 
barriers and hygiene on the farm, number of animal contacts, and the place stock is purchased 
(from sources with known health status versus markets and dealers premises) (Davies). Such 
influence of farmers on the size of risk is likely to cause problems of adverse selection and  5 
moral hazard (Rejda).  
  Adverse selection is to be minimized by differentiating premiums according to 
(measurable) risk factors. Measuring the risk of farms is facilitated through evolving systems 
in the field of ‘animal safety indices’ (Bokma-Bakker and Vesseur) and national identification 
and recording systems (Saatkamp et al.).   10 
  Moral hazard is to be minimized by contract specifications on ‘due diligence’ (again 
requiring measurable aspects of farming practices), and by the use of deductibles (for example 
by not covering the first week with business interruption). In relation to infected herds, the 
number of animals already dead at the time of stamping-out may be used as an (additional) 
measurable aspect of farming practices; many dead animals may indicate little alertness of the  15 
farmer.  
 
  Influence of governments on the size of risk. Governments decide on (and are held 
responsible for) the control measures taken during an epidemic. In this way, they largely 
influence the size of losses (of which they cover the direct costs themselves). In case of  20 
business interruption insurance, agreements between governments and insurers about the 
control strategies to be applied under various circumstances are necessary in order to prevent 
debates on this issue during an epidemic. For example, some measures may seem very 
expensive at the time they are taken but they may lead to significant lower eventual losses.  
  25 12 
  Hazard prone areas. In some areas the expected frequency of epidemics is higher than in 
other areas (Horst et al., 1999a). Stated factors determining this risk include the animal and 
herd densities, the incidence of wildlife that may be carriers, and the proximity of airports and 
seaports as source of infection. Also, the expected size of epidemics varies across areas, (also) 
largely depending on animal and herd densities. Differentiation of premiums according to the  5 
location of a farm is likely to increase the interest of farmers from outside hazard prone areas 
in the insurance (giving the insurer potential for risk spreading).  
  
  Solidarity instead of liability. The fact that, after the notification of an outbreak, 
governments decide on such measures as surveillance zones and pre-emptive slaughter makes  10 
it unreasonable to hold the farmer with the outbreak liable for the losses suffered by other 
farmers as a consequence of the measures taken. This is especially true since it is generally 
not possible to prove that the outbreak is due to the farmer’s (or for example a trader’s, or 
veterinarian’s) negligence (Howe and Whittaker). In these circumstances there is a need for 
some degree of solidarity among farmers. Solidarity is stimulated through setting minimum  15 
standards for ‘good farming practices’ at the national level; such standards give each farmer 
incentives to reduce the risk also those farmers who choose not to insure, for example 
because they can bear business interruption losses themselves, or, because they are ‘free 
riders’ (Stevens, and Howe and Whittaker). 
  20 
  Defining “business interruption”. The business interruption insurance in this paper covers 
business interruption losses from (partly) empty buildings. The losses related to repopulating 
the farm at the end of the period with business interruption are not considered insurable for 
reasons of moral hazard (although some fixed indemnity might be included in a business 13 
interruption insurance to cover such losses). Also for reasons of moral hazard, losses caused 
by surveillance zones are not considered insurable. 
  In relation to business interruption losses from empty buildings, the issue whether farm 
buildings are empty can be determined objectively, leaving few opportunities for fraud. This 
is especially true in case of depopulation; in case of buildings emptied from welfare slaughter,  5 
information from official sources about the exact moment of welfare slaughter and the 
number of animals actually slaughtered is likely to be necessary to exclude fraud.  
    
Discussion  
  10 
There are several arguments in favor of increasing the feasibility of a farm business 
interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever. First, the insurance may reduce the size of 
the risk through such aspects as premium differentiation and clauses of ‘due diligence’ (see 
also Kunreuther). Second, more generally, insurance schemes have potential benefits for the 
society as a whole (see for example Arrow).  15 
  A possible way to increase the feasibility of business interruption insurance is to (further) 
reduce the size of risk (so that premium rates can become lower). Giving farmers incentives 
for preventing losses (and minimizing the extent of losses during an epidemic) is crucial in 
this respect. Mutual insurance companies have more opportunities to give such higher 
incentives to farmers than insurance companies organized otherwise (Vaughan and Vaughan).  20 
Mutuals are owned by the insured farmers. There is therefore likely to be broader support for 
premium differentiation since colleague farmers instead of anonymous insurance 
companies impose these measures. Mutuals also make proper loss assessment easier (which 
reduces problems of moral hazard and fraud) because of social control, and familiarity of 
colleague farmers with production circumstances. Mutuals are furthermore allowed to charge  25 14 
insureds relatively low advance premiums but additionally assess them ‘surcharges’ 
(generally to some limit) once losses become larger than the advance premiums paid. Such 
surcharges are a direct incentive for loss prevention (Vaughan and Vaughan). 
  Another possible way to increase the feasibility of the insurance is to decrease farmers’ 
premium rates by spreading the risks more broadly. In our case this would, for example,  5 
imply that rates for farmers in the northern part of the Netherlands would not be completely 
differentiated according to the lower levels of risk in this part of the country. Such solidarity 
would be justified if farmers in less hazard prone areas face increased profits from the 
occurrence of epidemics (as was the case during the 1997/98 CSF-epidemic in the 
Netherlands).  10 
  Some financial involvement of governments could also increase the feasibility of business 
interruption insurance. Governments could, for example, provide some starting buffer for 
insurers (to handle the risk of major epidemics occurring after the start of the insurance), or 
they could subsidize farmers’ premiums to some extent. If governments subsidize the 
catastrophic part of the risk (i.e. the upper tail of the loss distribution), premiums would  15 
reduce significantly (as shown in Table 2). Note that the premiums in Table 2 were based on 
expected claim costs alone. Had we included other costs such as reserve loads, the relative 
decrease in premiums would be even larger since insurers generally include large reserve and 
catastrophe loads for the catastrophic part of risks (Hogarth and Kunreuther, and Doherty).  
  20 
Conclusions 
 
The goal of this paper was to study the feasibility of a farm business interruption insurance for 
Classical Swine Fever. Given that quantitative insight into the size of risk can be obtained 
from such detailed simulation model as described in this paper, and carefully considering  25 15 
issues such as the systemic character of the risk, farmers’ and governments’ influence on the 
size of risk, and the importance of some degree of solidarity among farmers, we conclude that 
a business interruption insurance for Classical Swine Fever is in principle feasible.  
  The feasibility of the insurance would be improved through spreading the risk among 
larger groups of farmers, through some financial involvement of the government, and by the  5 
provision of the insurance through ‘mutual companies’. 
  Considering similar analytical frameworks as presented in this paper, we argue that 
business interruption insurance is in principle also feasible for other livestock epidemics, such 
as Foot and Mouth Disease and Swine Vesicular Disease. 
  10 
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1 These losses thus do not refer to the costs of buying a new herd; government compensation 
for the slaughtered herd is generally sufficient to buy back a herd of equal quality.
 
2 The number of iterations carried out is at least 500, or until the percentage change of the 
mean and standard deviation of the losses is 1.5 per cent or lower. 
3 The ‘high risk period’ is the period in which virus is already present in a country but not yet 
detected or under control (Horst et al., 1999a). 20 
Table 1. Annual losses from CSF in the southern part of the Netherlands (expected 




Min 50%  95%  Max 
Most likely scenario (i=3100)
a          
Total losses  246  0  0  1404  4462 
Consequential losses farmers           
-  Business interruption from depopulation  10  0  0  61  181 
-  Business interruption from welfare slaughter  8  0  0  47  215 
-  Repopulation and surveillance zones   14  0  0  89  292 
Pessimistic scenario (i=1800)           
Total losses  761  0  0  3336  8572 
Consequential losses farmers           
-  Business interruption from depopulation  18  0  0  77  199 
-  Business interruption from welfare slaughter  30  0  0  130  283 
-  Repopulation and surveillance zones  38  0  0  168  434 
Optimistic scenario (i=3800)          
Total losses  75  0  0  641  2653 
Consequential losses farmers           
-  Business interruption from depopulation  3  0  0  25  118 
-  Business interruption from welfare slaughter  1  0  0  8  61 
-  Repopulation and surveillance zones  6  0  0  49  159 
a Number of iterations carried out. 21 
Table 2. Expected premium rates for farm business interruption insurance with and 
without catastrophic part of loss distribution
a (in US $) 
  With catastrophic risk  Without catastrophic risk 
Most likely scenario  
Premium per sow (US $ / year)  8.44  5.23 
Premium per finishing place (US $ / year)  1.77  1.09 
Pessimistic scenario 
Premium per sow (US $ / year)  23.11  11.41 
Premium per finishing place (US $ / year)  4.84  2.39 
Optimistic scenario  
Premium per sow (US $ / year)  1.91  0.71 
Premium per finishing place (US $ / year)  0.40  0.15 















Figure 1. Flow diagram of Monte-Carlo simulation model for Classical Swine Fever 
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Figure 2. Probability density function (PDF) of the number of CSF-epidemics 
























Figure 3. Expected total losses from a CSF-epidemic in the southern part of 
the Netherlands in most likely scenario (million US $)  
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Figure 4. Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of business interruption losses from a 
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